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ABSTRACT
Orthodox international relations literature uses the word
hegemony to describe a situation in which one nation state is able to
dominate the global ordering of nation states due to its preponderance
o f material resources.
By contrast Antonio Gramsci develops a theory of
hegem ony, frequently called "ideological hegem ony," which situates
the possibilities for hegemonic power in the ability of a dominant class
to universalize its particular point o f view.
Although Gramsci applies
the theory of hegemony to explain political pow er configurations
within post World W ar I Italy, that theory provides a backdrop for a
theory of hegemony in the intemationjfl arena.
Not only does a
Gram scian theory o f international hegemony
allows for an
understanding o f pow er which incorporates both m aterial resources
and belief systems, but also the Gramscian approach implies particular
strategies for international politics with or without hegemonic pow er
co n figurations.
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GRAMSCI AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Chapter I
Hegemony:

From Political Realism to Historical Materialism

Expressed through a variety of guises orthodox
relations theorists use the word hegemony to mean the

international
ability o f one

nation-state to dominate the international state system because o f its
preponderance of material resources.

Robert O.

Keohane expands the

orthodox construct to incorporate the notion that mere m aterial
preponderance must be accompanied by an "ability and willingnes" to
assert national power.

Further,

Robert Cox develops a theory of

hegemony within the parameters o f historical materialism.

Below, the

orthodox frameworks are outlined with an emphasis on hegemony as an
expression of national power.
Keohane's and

By

Cox's contributions

way o f contrast and criticism both
to an analysis o f

international system are addressed.

hegemony

in the

As the argument dem onstrates, all

schools involved consider hegemony to be a system-wide concept.
However, the component parts o f

that international system are

constrained by theoretical building

blocks.

These approaches

converge where m aterial resources are emphasized, but they

differ

where power is defined in more than material terms.
Like

all fram eworks for interpreting the world, international

relations theory is historically laden.

One may argue that Neorealism

developed as a response to perceived weaknesses in older Realist
international relations thought.

A rchetypal spokesmen o f the R ealist
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3
camp would include E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.
of Neorealism are fundamentally rooted in Realism.

However, the ideas
And, in a sense,

Neorealism represents a micro adjustment to a well established Realist
paradigm.
In a succinct passage of The Twenty Years Crisis E. H. Carr
outlines the main tenets of the Realist approach.

First, the process of

history is understood as a sequence o f cause and effect relationships
that exist beyond, and cannot be changed by, mind processes .
practice creates theory, and not visa versa .
product of power" (1946/ 1964:

64).

And, third,

Second,

"morality is the

Carr's emphasis on the re a lp o litik

of power as the underlying historical reality, and motivating force in
the historic process, remains central to the world view o f modem
R ealists and N eorealists.
Although Carr presents M achiavelli as the "first important
realist," the tradition of political Realism dates to antiquity.
Thucydides' The Peloponnesian
expression.
e.g.,

Frequently

W ar is cited as a founding textual

In the orthodox texts one finds references to Thucydides--

that " The strong do what they can.

The weak suffer what they

must" (Thucydides, Book V, paragraph 90 [Chapter XVII, M odem Library
ed. p. 311] ).*

And, from the ancients to modernity the application of

this tradition to international affairs rests its analysis on three
assumptions that

determine a point of entry to the world as well as

possible outcomes in the international world.
be summarized as follows (Keohane, 1986a:
1.

These assumptions may
7):

States (or city states) are the key units o f action.

1 Cited (Keohane, 1986b:

177).
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2. States seek power, either as an end in itself or as a
means to other ends.
3. States behave in ways that are, by and large, rational,
and therefore com prehensible to outsiders in rational
terms.
In brief, Realism posits nation-states as primary actors in the
international field.

Such states behave with

nearly universal

rationality to maximize their pow er positions in the international
arena.

Here the maximization of power is a key attribute of

international politics.

As Carr states in The Twenty Years C risis: "in the

international order, the role of power is greater and that o f morality
less" (1946:

168). 2 And, indeed, power is a key concern o f historical

international relations theorists and practitioners.
Politics

Among

N ations

(1948/1967)

M orgenthau

For instance in
portrays

international

politics as a struggle for power where agents of the nation state "think
and act in terms of power"(1948/1967: 5).3
Realism applied to international affairs has em phasized the
importance o f a balance of power within the nation-state system.

In

M orgenthau's writings the balance of power becomes a key concept for
understanding

stability

and change in the nation-state

system .^

In one

of the senses in which M orgenthau expresses the balance o f power, it is
a natural growth which follows from the reality of power politics and
the struggle for power

among nations (Keohane, 1986a:

2 Cited (Keohane, 1986a:

8).

3 Cited (Keohane, 1986a:

10).

13).

However,

4 In Politics Among Nations balance of powers possesses two
referents.
First, it is a "universal concept" which refers to
international power balance equilibrium s (Keohane, 1986a:
13).
And,
second, it is a "necessary outgrowth" o f power politics and describes the
situation of any power struggle (Keohane, 1986a:
13).
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within M orgenthau1s own work the idea of power remains an elusive
phenomenon.

Keohane aptly points out that "his definition o f power

was murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource . .
. and power as the ability to influence others behavior" (1986a:

11).

Both Realists and Neorealists tend to view the international
political arena in terms of a structural analysis.

In a sense, rationally

behaving nation-states seek power within the param eters of an over
arching

international system

which is subject to

structural constraints.

This system simultaneously acts to constrain the possibilities of
rationally behaving states and lays the field upon which interstate
action occurs.

Structure both limits and makes possible specific

possibilities in international political struggles.

It is this notion o f an

international system which leads Kenneth N. W altz to comment that :
"The

enduring

anarchic

character o f international politics

accounts

for

the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the
millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent" (1986:

53).

In an effort to revamp and fine tune the Realist model Kenneth
N. W altz has developed a theory of "structural realism."

He describes the

nature of his systems theory, and systems theories in general, in the
follow ing

way:
[SJystems theories, whether political or economic, are
theories that explain how the organization o f the realm
acts as a constraining and disposing force on the
interacting units within it.
Such theories tell us about the
forces the units are subject to. From them, we can infer
some things about the expected behavior and fate o f the
units: namely, how they will have to compete with and
adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish
(1986: 60).

From the outset it should be noted that W altz's structural realism
examines the structure as a whole, leaving aside the internal attributes
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of the nation-states composing that structure (1986).
structure in three dimensions.

First, the "ordering

He defines
principle" of the

international system is self-help within anarchy (1986: 81).
"the character of the units," or nation states,

Second,

is "like units" (1986:

87).

The sim ilarity o f nation states in the international system is determined
by the condition o f international anarchy which precludes any
hierarchial ordering of states.

And, third, "the distribution of

capabilities across units" in the international system is a balance-ofpower (1986:

93).

Waltz uses power as the determinate system variable :

"Power is is estimated by comparing the capabilities across units . . . .
The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a
system-wide concept" (1986:
which assum es rationally

93).

Like Morgenthau's classical Realism

behaving states which seek pow er within

situation of power politics and an historical balance of power, W altz's
structural realism ends in
states:

"Balance-of-power

requirements are met:

a balance o f power theory.

Ashe

clearly

politics prevail wherever two, and

only two,

that the order be anarchic and that it be

populated by units wishing to survive" (1986:

121).

Another attempt to modify the Realist program while
sim ultaneously

m aintaining

Koehane's Neorealism.

an

em phasis

on

international

Keohane's proposed model

structuralist research program , which relaxes

structure

is

is a "modified

some o f the assumptions

of Structural Realism but retains enough o f the hard core to

generate a

priori predictions on the

basis o f inform ation about the

environment" (1986b: 191).

And, to encourage this project he calls for

better theories of "domestic politics, decision making, and

international

com m unication"

to "narrow

the gap"

between international

and

domestic understandings o f politics (1986b: 191).
Keohane em phasizes the importance o f understanding the
"context of action before understanding the action i ts e lf
structural analysis

emphasizes the role o f structure

(i.e.,

as both

constraining and creating possibilities for action), and he notes that
structuralism

adds

a "irreplaceable

of action" (1986b: 193).

c o m p o n e n t for a thorough analysis

It is from this basis that he restructures the

R ealist research program.

Re-examining the assumptions o f Realism he

calls for modification o f all three assumptions.
will be considered
nonstate,

primary actors, the new program

intergovernm ental

(1986b: 193).

First, although states

organizations,

and

also

includes

tran sn atio n al

actors

Each was ignored in the classical paradigm, but these

organizations are real actors in the modern international arena.
Second, although a rationality assumption is granted to allow for a link
betw een structure and behavior it will not assume "perfect inform ation,
consideration
preferences"

o f all possible
(1986b:

alternatives,

or unchanging actor

194).^ And, third, the assumption that "states seek

power, and calculate their interests accordingly, would be qualified
severely"(1986b:

194). Keohane contends that states do other things

than attem pt to maximize international power.

In particular during

situations o f domestic crisis states may act to merely maintain

5 Koehane criticizes Realist constructs of rationality, at least in
part, for their affinity for m icro-econom ic understandings o f
rationality.
He notes that "to say that governments act rationally in this
sense means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that
they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order
to maximize their utility in light o f both o f those preferences and their
perceptions of the nature o f reality" (1986a:
11).
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sovereignty w ithout attem pting to maximize their global position
(1986b: 194).
By challenging

the limits o f structural Realism Keohane hopes to

broaden the focus of debate to bring Realist theory in closer proximity
to "reality."

Regarding the Realist power seeking assumption,

not only

does he reject claims that states always seek to maximize power, but also
he rejects the claim that power is systemically fungible.

Rather he

assumes a differentiation of "power resources" to achieve differing
goals:

"[P] ower resources are differentially effective across issue areas,

and the usability of a given set of power resources depends upon the
’policy-contingent fram ew orks’ w ithin which it m ust be employed"
(1986b: 194). His emphasis on "policy contingent frameworks" opens the
possibility that beyond m aterial

structure

"institutions"

ought be included in structural analysis (1986b:

194).

and

"rules"

Further, this

approach broadens the parameters o f what may be included as a power
resource.

In the Realist paradigm power is a material asset.

Power can

be quantitatively measured (for the most part), and it is fungible.
contrast Keohane imposes

By

organizational and issue area dimensions to

determ ining national power.
K eohane’s Neorealism broadens the horizons o f R ealist thought
by incorporating a generation's worth o f research into econom ic
reasoning, the

developm ent o f m ulti-national corporations, the

recognition o f international institutions,
evidence.

global

and the weight o f case

N evertheless Keohane's approach is deeply embedded in the

R ealist tradition.

Although the two schools part at certain points, they

share common categorical assumptions.

Keohane does not reject the

9
Realist framework, he merely adjusts the assumptions to fit his
perception of "reality” more closely.
*

Above

a fram ework

*

*

for understanding the underlying

of Realism and Neorealism was outlined.

prem ises

At this point I would like

interject the notion of hegemony into the discussed literature.

Put

simply, hegemony, as it is used in the orthodox literature, refers to a
condition under which one nation is able to achieve a position of
international dom inance because o f its m aterial preponderance. A

look

at Gilpin's theory of hegemonic decline and war causation, and
K eohane's

analysis

of hegemony

and

cooperation

in international

political economy demonstrate the point sufficiently.
W ithin the orthodox camp Robert O. Keohane has argued that
across tim e the m ajor concerns o f international relations are "the
sources of discord and of war and the conditions of o f cooperation and
peace" (1986a:

3).

In particular his research focuses on the possibilities

for international cooperation.

In A fter hegemony:

Cooperation and

Discord in the W orld Political Economy (1984) Keohane argues for the
possibility

o f cooperation in international political economy after the

collapse of hegemonic regimes.

As

given he suggests that

where common interests exist cooperation often fails" (1984:

"even where
6).

But he

does not address the problems o f why common interests exist in the first
place, or how they can be created.

In this work common interests are

assumed, and he consciously leaves out economic and ideological
mechanism s which may generate the perception common interests.
he tells the reader:

As

"I neither explore how economic conditions affect

patterns o f interests, nor do I investigate the effects of ideas and ideals
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on state behavior" (1984:

6).

It is from this perspective that he precedes

to argue that hegemony

is not necessary for cooperation

o f international

economy.

political

in the sphere

Keohane's argument that cooperation is possible without
hegemony is, at least in

part, a criticism of the orthodox "theory of

hegemonic stability."

Put simply, the theory of hegemonic stability

defines the condition

of international hegemony

ability
dom inant

to m aintain an

as one nation-state's

order in the international arena

because of that

nation-state (hegem on) commands a preponderance

material resources (Keohane, 1984:

12).

of

:

The theory o f hegemonic stability, as applied to the world
political econom y, defines hegemony as preponderance o f
m aterial resources.
Four sets o f resources are especially
important.
Hegemonic powers
must have control over raw
m aterials, control over sources o f capital, control over
m arkets, and com petitive advantages in the production of
highly valued goods (1984: 32).
U nderlying the theory o f hegemonic stability Keohane finds two
general propositions. First, hegemonic stability im plies that "order in
world politics is typically created by a single dominant actor (1984:

31).

And, second, the theory suggests that the maintenance o f a particular
world order requires a perpetual hegemon (1984:
Kindleberger states:

305).^

Hegemony in

depends upon one nation-state

m aterial preponderance.
rules o f international

Or, as

"for the world economy to be stabilized, there has

to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (1973:
international politics

31).

In a hegem onic

asserting its

international system

the

behavior are enforced by the hegem onic nation-

6 Charles Kindleberger, The W orld in Depression. 1929-1939
(Berkley: University o f California Press, 1973). Cited in (Keohane,
1984: 31)
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state over

the whole nation-state system.

Thus, hegemony is understood

as the ability of one nation-state to dominate the system as a whole due
to its material preponderance.

If the dominant state, or hegemon, loses

its superior command of material resources
of a

(perhaps symbolized by loss

competitive edge in the global political economy) then the order it

created and stability it exported are undermined.
Like K oehane's abstention from exploring the possible cultural
and ideological sources of cooperation, this theory entirely ignores
non-quantifiable

variables

in determ ining

hegem onic

power.

The

theory assumes a common understanding of which raw m aterials are
valuable,

power structures that enable one nation to control

sources of

capital, and a common understanding o f economic com petitiveness.
Further, it leaves out any ideological conditions that would allow for this
commonality of interests.
One application of the theory o f hegemonic stability can be found
in G ilpin's

argument that war is

international hegemony.
that "the

likely under conditions of declining

Using essentially R ealist prem ises he argues

distribution of power among states constitutes the

form of control in every international system"(1981:

29 ) J

principal
Changes in

the international system

are reflected in rising and declining nation

state hegemony where

"the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the

beginning
(1981:

o f another cycle o f growth expansion and eventual decline"

210).8

He suggests that the sources o f hegemonic decline are

rooted in economic processes that lead the form erly perponderent

7 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b:

177).

8 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b:

177).
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nation-state to lose its hegemonic position (1981:
of a nation-state's declining

115, 159).^

The result

hegemonic position is a less than

peaceful

transform ation of the global political structure, or, in other words, a
hegemonic war.

Gilpin's use o f a theory of hegemonic stability

ultim ately relies on a "basic force" model o f international power
(Keohane, 1986b).

And his use of hegemony is easily reducible to the

m aterial force model Keohane identifies with the orthodox theory of
hegem onic

stab ility .

D issatisfied with past expositions o f theory o f hegemonic
stability, Keohane

tackles

the problem o f the formation and subsequent

collapse of the post W orld W ar II international monetary
was formulated through the Bretton Woods Agreements.
theory of hegemonic stability utterly inadequate.

regime which
He finds the old

Instead o f finding

that the collapse o f the Bretton Woods system lead to an end of
international

cooperation,

which the

theory

o f hegem onic

stability

would predict,

international cooperation continues in the post-

hegemonic age.

In particular he offers three criticisms o f the model.

First, the model focuses only on tangible resources to calculate change
and leaves out the role o f

"confidence" in international affairs.

Second,

the model ignores the possibility of a "dual" nature o f power relations.
And, third, the model "overpredicts" the effects of a regime collapse
(1984:

207).
Given these weaknesses in the theory o f hegemonic stability

Keohane sets out to reform ulate the model along the lines of his
Neorealism.

Unfortunately,

Keohane's exposition o f his own position is

9 Cited in (Keohane, 1986b:

178).
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foggier than his criticisms of the Realist model. 10

To Keohane

hegemony is a derivative concept which incorporates facets o f political
Realism and Marxism.

From the Realists he inherits the concept of

hegemony as a "preponderance of material resources" (1984:

32).

To

this he adds Imm anuel W allerstein's definition of economic hegemony:
a situation wherein the products o f a given core state are
produced so efficiently that they are by and large
com petitive even in the core areas, and therefore the
given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a
maximally free world market (1980: 38).H
Keohane presents a sketch o f M arxist understanding o f hegemony based
on a generic theory o f Marxism which supposes that a M arxist critique
of the world political economy begins with an analysis of class and
uneven developm ent w ithin the capitalist global economy.
m aintains that w ithin the M arxist fram ework

He

"theories of hegemony

are necessarily partial, since they do not explain changes in the
contradictions facing capitalism" (1984:
Citing the influence o f
on his theory,

42).

Marxists,

Realists, and

Institutionalists

Keohane provides a definition o f hegemony that

10 K eohane’s analysis ultim ately concerns the possibilities of
cooperation in the global political economy where cooperation is
understood in contrast to discord.
"[C]ooperation takes place when one
policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its
partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result
of a process of policy coordination. . . (1984: 52). From the Realsit
appoach Keohane notes that cooperation is merely the logical extention
of a grand power struggle (1984: 7). From the Institutionalist
framework Keohane notes that ”[c]ooperation is essential in in a world
o f interdependence," and institutions foster cooperation (1984: 7).
1 1 Immanuel W allerstein, The M odem W orld System II:
M ercantilism and the Consolidation o f the European W orld-Economv.
1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980). Cited in Keohane, 1984.
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transcends the basic force model.

Referring to work done by Keohane

and Nye he redefines hegemony in the following way:
Hegemony is defined as a situation in which 'one state
pow erful enough to m aintain the essential rules
governing interstate relations and w illing to do so'
(Keohane and Nye, 1977: 44).

is

This revised use of hegemony differs in two basic respects from the
Realist construct.

First, unlike the theory o f hegemonic stability

Keohane does not assume "an automatic link" between the possession of
power and leadership (1984:

34).

Second, this revamped use of

hegemony not only emphasizes power, but also it considers the
"internal characteristics of the strong state" (1984:
"[i]t does not assume

35).

In summary,

that strength automatically creates incentives to

project one's power abroad.

Domestic attitudes, political structures, and

decision making processes are also important" (1984:

35).

By

reform ulating an understanding o f hegemony, and the role this fosters
in international cooperation, he proposes
hegem onic

leadership

and

a distinction betw een

im perialism .

Successful hegem onic leadership itself depends on a
certain asymm etrical cooperation. The hegemon plays a
distinctive role, providing its partners with with
leadership in tern for deference; but unlike imperial
power, it cannot make and enforce rules without acertain
degree of of consent from other sovereign states (1984:
46).
The emphasis on "asymmetrical cooperation"
K eohane's point.

is essential to

Instead o f overtly dominating the affairs o f other

nations, the hegemonic pow er must cooperate with the subjects o f

its

domination to the extent that the subjected nation is willing to "defer"
pow er to the hegemon.
im perialism

Hegemonic rule is differentiated from

because under the latter form o f international power

assertion the subjected

nation is overtly dominated.

By contrast

hegemonic rule implies conditions under which, for one reason or
another, the dominant nation is "willing and able" to extract
"deference" from the group o f nation-states.
K eohane's reform ulation of hegemony fits neatly into a "modified,
research program."

By relaxing the state as actor assumption he is able

to include domestic structure.

By relaxing the power seeking

assumption he is able to assert that the possession o f power does not
necessarily lead to its articulation.

And, by emphasizing the

possibilities for cooperation he is able to set hegemony aside as a unique
form of international domination.
hegemony

His refinements to the Realist use of

separates out brute, or overt, domination from sophisticated,

or sublime, control.

In the former case one nation dominates the

international arena because it has the material power to do so.
latter case,

In the

mere possession o f power is not enough, the powerful state

m ust also possess sufficient intranational
deference to assert its power.

consensus and international

A ccepting Keohane's contributions

towards a theory of international hegemony it is still useful to note the
ability o f one nation to make and m aintain rules in the international
arena is still rooted in material abundance.

Although Keohane allows

space for "w illingness"

and

"deference," m aterial abundance remains

the base of the theory.

As I suggested earlier, Keohane's Neorealism is

merely a micro adjustment to the Realist paradigm.

at

His language and

concerns remain the same as ardent realists.
In addition to Realist and N eorealist theories o f international
hegemony, Robert Cox has developed a theory o f hegemony in the
international system that, in large part, is derived from Antonio
Gramsci's ideological hegemony.

Cox's approach is that of an historicist
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M arxist (Cox, 1986).

Cox's contributions

because he successfully

bridges

are extremely significant

the concerns o f orthodoxy and the

insights of Gramsci's exploration of ideology as a power resource.
Cox's approach to understanding the workings o f power in the
international system is rooted in the tradition o f historical materialism .
To Cox historical materialism is a form of Marxism which "reasons
historically and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social
relations" (1986:

214).

"structural" M arxism

He contrasts this mode of analysis with

which is essentially

static in historical

perspective and focuses prim arily on the capitalist mode of production.
Cox sees an analogy between

Realism versus Neorealism as compared to

historical m aterialism versus "structuralism ."

W hile both Realism and

historical m aterialism are rooted in historical modes o f thought, there
derivative spin-offs, structuralism
historical approaches

and N eorealism , share an a-

and essentialist epistem ologies (1986:

215).

Cox suggests that a historical m aterialist approach provides
several useful insights for international analysis.

First, historical

m aterialism argues from the standpoint o f dialectics.
theory at both "logical" and "real history" levels.
the dialectic
m ethod

This affects the

At the level o f "logic"

approach seeks to understand phenomenon through

o f dialogic contradicition—"a dialogue

the exploration of contradictions" (Cox, 1986:

seeking truth

215).

a

through

And, at the level of

"real history" the dialectic method explores the "potential for
alternative

forms of

developm ent arising from the confrontations of

opposed social forces in any concrete social formation" (Cox, 1986:
W ith

dialectical reasoning

historical m aterialism

approaches

through different lenses than either Realism or Neorealism.

215).

conflict

In both of
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the latter approaches conflict is understood as either rooted in a fixed
human nature (M orgenthau,

1948) or a recurring phenom enon in all

international orders (Koehane,
approach roots

1986a).

conflict as part

human nature is reconstituted.

The historical m aterialist

of a historical process through which
Conflict both occurs in history with

remaking of human nature and, concurrently,

the

in "the creation of new

patterns of social relations which change the rules o f the game out o f
which. . . new forms of conflict may be expected
(Cox, 1986:

215).

The recurrence of conflict

ultimately to arise"

is historically rooted in

changing patterns of social relationships and a m alleable human
nature.
A second difference between Noerealism and and historical
m aterialism is the latter's emphasis on imperialism as adding a
"vertical" dimension to international power, or, in M arxist term s, the
domination o f the center over the periphery (Cox, 1986:
approach

violates

the

N eorealist assumption

that the

arena is contained by a situation of self-help anarchy.

216). This
international
By contrast a

historical m aterialist approach would postulate a hierarchy of states,
and/or regions over other states and regions;
for

an

em phasis

on

core-periphery

thus, the theory allows

tensions.

Third, historical m aterialism focuses upon the relationship
between the state and civil society (Cox, 1986:

216).

While the Realist

perspective views the State as the primary actor in international
affairs, leaving out the internal attributes and ordering of the State,
the historical m aterialist approach pays close attention to the
interrelatedness, or lack there of, o f civil institutions—the degree of
there developm ent and articulation—and state power.

Not only is the
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state as primary actor axiomatic in the Realist approach, but also,
relationships w ithin the state and interstate relations that are not
articulated through state channels—such as dictums by the Holy Roman
Catholic

Church--are excluded from consideration.

And, fourth, historical m aterialism focuses on "the production
process as a critical element in the explanation o f the particular
historical form taken by a state/society complex" (Cox, 1986:

216).

W hile the N eorealist, or Realist counterpart, argues from the
perspective of the State, the historical m aterialist argues from the point
o f the c a p ita lis t state.

W ithin this tradition it is argued that the

capitalist state is not a generic state.

The capitalist state is particular

state with particular interests that arise, at least in part, from the
nature capitalist production techniques.
m aterialism

exam ines the

connections

Cox emphasizes:

"Historical

between pow er in production,

power in the state, and power in international relations" (1986:

216).

By contrast in W altz’s structural realist model the dominant relations of
production within a society are o f a lower order than the state, and,
consequently,

these

relationships

are excluded

from

rigorous

structural

analysis.
Cox’s historical m aterialism utilizes a notion o f "historical
structures."

These structures are "a picture of a particular

configuration of forces"

which "impose pressures

human actions (Cox, 1986:

217).

Three categories of force are of

interest in this m odel--"m aterial capabilities,"
"institutions" (1986:

218).

and constraints" on

"ideas," and

Put simply, material capabilities are the

"productive and destructive potentials" of a society (1986:

218).

would include factors o f production—land, labor, techniques of

They
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production—as well as tools of destruction.

Ideas are both

intersubjective m eanings, and cross-cultural
historic structure (1986:

218).

o f a specific

In this sense ideas are the sets of beliefs

shared within a group and across groups.
natural or human rights

"images"

is shared

For instance, the notion of

both within many nation-states

(particular groups) across many national borders.

And, institutions are

"the means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order" (1986:
219).

This institutional component would include, but not be limited to,

state

apparatuses, financial m arkets, educational systems, and religious

organizations.

Regarding the relationship o f these forces Cox states:
No one-way determinism need be assumed among these
three; the relationships can be assumed to be reciprocal.
The question of which way the lines o f force run is always
a historical question to be answered by a study o f the
particular case (1986: 218).

Taken individually

and collectively the elements of a historic

structure can be used to describe the level, or degree, of hegemony
within a society.

That is, one can distinguish between hegemonic and

nonhegemonic social structures.

Or as Cox states, "between those in

which the power basis tends to recede into the background of
consciousness, and those

in which

is always in the forefront"(1986:

the management o f pow er relations
219).

Although no single element of

the historic strucure causes the rise or decline o f hegemonic power, the
role of institutions is emphasized because it is through institutions that
hegemonic power is articulated (Cox, 1986:

218).

Here hegemony is used in a sense which radically differs from
R ealist or N eorealist understandings. Cox has defined hegemony as "the
tem porary

universalization

in thought o f a particular pow er structure,

conceived not as domination but as

the necessary order of nature" (1982:

20
38).

In this sense hegemony is not understood as material

preponderance.

R ather hegemony is the result o f a particular power

structure being legitimized to the point o f universality in the eyes of
historic subjects.
A pplying the notion o f historic

structure to the international

context, Cox delimits three analogous forces.

First, the relationship of

the prevailing organization o f production and social forces (1986:

220).

Second, the "forms of state" as understood from the perspective o f
historical materialism as civil society-state complexes (1986:

220).

And,

third, "world orders," or "the particular configurations o f forces which
successively define problematic o f war and peace for the ensemble o f
states" (1986:

220).

It is at the level of world order that hegemonic

power configurations occur.

But hegemony at the level of the system

does not mean the domination o f one state over other states merely
through "aggressive m ilitary and economic policies" (1982:

45).

Hegemony at the system level requires that the social order articulated
by the dominant nation appears as a natural global order.

And, it should

be noted that the global system does not necessarily possess hegemonic
characteristics at all times.

Global power structures can shift from

hegem onic to nonhegem onic forms depending on the unity or disunity
o f international forces.

The hegemonic global order could be

characterized by a globally dominant form o f production and nation
state civil society/state complexes which support the dominant mode o f
production.

This would be the case for hegemony formed around a

"world order" based on nation-states.
In summary the conditions for a global hegemony would include:
1.
2.

a globally dominant mode of production;
a dominant state (or conceivably dominant group of
states acting in concert);

21
3.
a normative and institutional component that lays down
general rules of behavior for states and the forces o f civil
society that act across state boundaries. . . (Cox, 1982: 45).
These conditions are prerequisite for global hegemony.

It should be

remembered that Cox does not lim it the concept of hegemony to the
global system.

It is also possible to discuss hegemony in "the social

relations of production" and "social formation" (1982:

42-43).
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Further, it is interesting to note that Cox’s preconditions for global
hegemony are not at odds with Keohane's infusion of "ability and
willingness"

into the orthodox use.

However, where Keohane extends

the basic force model to allow for the role of consent and deference, his
model

does not articulate the necessary relationships o f mediation

allow global domination to become hegemony.

Keohane argues

that
that the

possession of an abundance o f material resources does not necessarily
translate into hegemony,
relationship

betw een,

and he does not specify the location of, or

institutional forces

create a hegemonic global order.

and econom ic

forces that

Cox’s argument for historical

structures offers a useful heuristic for grappling with the nature of
mediated power relationships.
Following

the orthodox literature Cox argues that two historic

"global orders" based in hegemony within the nation-state system were
pax

b ritannica and pax

am erican a.

In each of these instances the

12 At the level of "relations of production" hegemony occurs
where both the existing mode o f production and relations o f production
support a power structure that appears as natural, or at least, necessary.
And, at the level o f "social formation" hegemony occurs where two
conditions are met. First, the existence of a ” abroad coalition of classes
under the leadership o f one class that is able to make to make
concessions adequate to m aintain support, or acquiescence from
subordinate classes in the coalition;" and, second, the existence o f "a
state that acts to consolidate this class coalition and to promote the mode
o f social relations o f production consistent with the continuing
dominance of the leading class" (Cox, 1982: 43).
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global system was directed by a nation-state that was able to
universalize its conception of the world order.
the working o f the nation-state system
n a tio n -sta te

Under pax

were directed from

b ritan n ica
the dominant

center.
In the m id-nineteenth century, B ritian's world suprem acy
was founded on its sea power, which remained free from
challenge by a continental state as a result o f Britian's
ability to play the role of balancer in a relatively fluid
balance of power in Europe. The norms of liberal
economics . . . gained widespread acceptance with the
spread of British prestige, providing a universalistic
ideology which presented these norms as the harmony of
interests.
W hile there were no formal institutions, the
ideological separation of economics from politics meant
that the City could appear as adm inistrator and regulator
according to these universal rules,
with British sea power
rem aining in the background as potential enforcer (1986:
223).

The decline of British hegemony and the eventual ascendance o f
Am erican hegemony w itnessed not only

a transform ation o f which

particular nation articulated and supported a global order, but also that
transform ation witnessed a change in the very structure o f the world
order.
The

decline o f British hegemony may be viewed from the

perspective o f changes in the interrelation of forces.

In particular, the

division of the world into ideologically opposed power blocks may have
facilitated the rise o f American hegemony.

By contrast to British

hegem ony, American hegemony was considerably more masked.

That

is, although America certainly possessed the economic and m ilitary
m ight to enforce a particular world order in the post W orld W ar II era,
the period between the late nineteenth century through world war II
provided vast structural changes in the global economy and make up of
nation-states that encouraged Europe and

Japan to follow an American
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lead.

Describing the hiddenness of American might during the p a x

a m e ric a n a era Cox suggests:
The United States rarely needed to intervene directly
in
support of specific national economic interests; by
m aintaining the rules o f an international econom ic order
according to the revised liberalism o f Bretton Woods, the
strength of U.S. corporations involved in the pursuit of
profits was sufficient to ensure continuing national
power. The pax am ericana produced a greater number o f
form al international institutions
than the earlier
hegemony.
The nineteenth century separation o f
economic and politics had been blurred by the Great
Depression and the rise o f Keynesian doctrines.
Since
states now had a legitimate and necessary overt role in
national economic m anagem ent, it became necessary both
to m ultilateralize the adm inistrative m anagem ent o f the
international economy and to give it an
intergovernm ental quality (1896:
224).
W hile the form er British hegemony had been relatively lacking in
international institutions,

the post-w orld war II A m erican

utilized international institutions
global economic order.

hegemony

to legitim ize its view o f a proper

Further, the formation o f this order was

facilitated by the perceived Soviet threat, the relative economic
deprivation of Europe after World W ar II,
interdependence
Not

betw een

and growing economic

nation-states.

only did the center o f international power change hands

from Britian to the United States, but also the global order
changed.

itself

On the one hand British hegemony depended on Britian's

w illingness and ability to articulate, export, and enforce through
a specifically liberal world view.

policy

On the other hand, American

hegemony depended not only on the ability and willingness to export a
world view, but also it required the formation o f coalitions to enforce
that view.

The United States could not by itself, universalize its

perception of a

natural world order.

That perception o f the proper

world order required the active consent of

potential partners.

One
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example of the give and take process occurring in the establishm ent o f
American hegemony is the talks between W hite and Keynes,

spokesmen

for the United States and Britian respectively, at Bretton Woods.

The

program for a world economic order that emerged from the talks was
neither pure W hite nor pure Keynes.
reflects interest

Rather the Bretton Woods system

of both parties.

Cox's understanding of hegemony is a "particular fit between
power, ideology,

and institutions" (1986: 230).

An assessment of the

orthodox theory of hegemonic stability would not assume recurring
cycles o f one nation-state forming and m aintaining the rules o f the
international arena.
of historical structure,

R ather this approach would incorporate the idea
and for any particular global order

questions would be asked regarding hegemonic

two

stability.

1.
W hat are the mechanisms for m aintaining hegemony
in this particular historical structure?
2. What social forces and/or forms of state have been
generated w ithin it which could oppose and ultim ately
bring about a transform ation o f the structure? (Cox, 1986:
230).
Although these questions provide only a rough set o f guidelines for
where to begin

analyzing hegemony in the international system,

they

do set the researcher on a divergent path from the orthodox approach.
By way of critique of the orthodox theory o f hegemonic stability, Cox
argues that the method o f historical m aterialism calls for a
reconsideration o f what is to be explained—the problematic

itself.

His

approach would call for an examination of the "relative stability of
successive world orders" (1986:

222).

And, his use of hegemony, as

contrasted with the orthodox use, would provide an alternative basis for
understanding hegem onic world orders as stable world orders (1986:
223).

In this case state power is not a given:

it is part of what needs
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explanation.

The explanation of why states become powerful is

connected with the idea of an interplay between three levels o f force at
the national level and corresponding international forces.
W ith

this model the orthodox problematic o f explaining "the

sources of discord and war and the conditions o f cooperation and of
peace" is transformed.
hegem ony

w ithin

*3

First, instead of studying recurring cycles of

a relatively

fixed

understanding o f historical

structure, the revised theory o f hegemony allows for transform ation of
the global structure (e.g.,
rather than
consequently,

one

history is a succession of "global orders"

am orphous unchanging

structure).

a condition o f hegemony is not necessarily part of

stable global orders.
production techniques

all

Second, since the model examines the levels o f
and class

form ations, understandings

politics are not bound by state as actor assumptions.
m odel suggests that nation-state centricity
future

And,

o f global

And, third,

is historically bound.

the
A

(perhaps already emerging) global order may be based on

transnational

class relations under the

guidance o f an

international

"managerial class."
At the apex o f an emerging global class structure is the
transnational m anagerial class.
Having its own ideology,
strategy and institutions o f collective action, it is a class
both in itself and for itself. Its focal points o f organization,
the Trilateral Commission, World Bank, IMF and OECD,
develop both a framework of thought and guidelines for
policies.
From these points, class action penetrates
countries through a process o f internationalization o f the
state (Cox, 1986: 234).

13 In an introduction to Neorealism and its Critics Robert O.
Keohane suggests that across history the sources o f war and peace are
the fundam ental questions for international relations theory (1986:
3).
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Above I examined three approaches to understanding hegemony:
Realism , Neorealism, and historical materialism .
orthodox

The movement from

international relations theory to Cox's historical m aterialism

allows for a greatly enriched notion o f global hegemony.

The condition

o f international hegemony does not reflect the mere m aterial
preponderance o f the state among nation-states.

Instead hegemonic

global orders reflect a recognized degree o f uniform ity in international
production,
supports

the

and

an institutional com ponent which

dom inant production techniques,

articulates

exchange

and

relations,

and

underlying belief system, or ideology, which supports these relations.
At minimum the break between the orthodox international relations
theory and Cox's historical m aterialism represents a shift from studying
the

structural lim itations o f nation-state behavior within a relatively

static international system to studying changes in the production and
exchange processes
orders.

which create and

transform particular global

However, despite this fundam ental differences these

approaches all share an emphasis on m aterial m anifestations o f power.
Even in Cox's careful analysis of hegemony in the world order,

the

"positional picture" one arrives at is filtered through the production
process.

Cox's work goes a long way towards developing a m ulti

dim ensional m odel for understanding

international power.

However,

much o f his work has focused on the the level o f the production process
and relations o f production.

C hapter II
Hegemony:

a Gramscian Perspective

Since the 1971 publication o f Antonio Gramsci's Selections
Prison

From

W ritings the theory o f "ideological" hegemony has penetrated

scholastic as well as activist literature in the English speaking world.
Given the growing mass of Gramscian literature in English it should be
of no surprise that Gramscian theory has been assimilated into the
corpus o f international relations literature.

W ork by Robert Cox offers

provocative insights into the possibilities for expanding the
understanding

o f pow er in

Gramscian ideas.

the

international

sphere

by

incorporating

Borrowing from the wealth o f Gramsci's ideas Cox

develops a theory o f "hegemony and production."
discussed in the first chapter of this essay.
theory of hegemony

which follows is

His presentation was

The explication of

Gramsci's

an attempted reexamination

of

the meaning of, and possibilities for, hegemonic power in the
international world.

In particular, I argue that Gramsci develops

understanding of hegemony
theory and practice.

As a

an

which is applicable at both the levels of
theory, Gramscian hegemony adds to an

understanding of how power is articulated in international politics.

As

a strategy for global transform ation the idea of hegemony is a central
concept, which pulls together broader programs for societal change.

It

is not a plea for immediacy, or the catastrophic collapse of international
capitalism.

Instead, Gramsci's theory of "praxis" (Marxism) calls for
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root criticism , careful planning, and gradual transform ation.

In light

of the potentially genocidal powers o f the modem nation-state system,
these theory attributes should be amenable to everyone.
W riting in the wake of the Russian Revolution, World War I,
Italy's transition to capitalism, and the rise o f Italian Fascism, Gramsci
offers insights into the problems faced by revolutionaries of his age,
and, perhaps most im portantly, he develops fundamental criticism s of
the revolutionary orthodoxy o f his age—Marxism.

Gramsci's approach

to understanding the possibilities o f social transform ation

differs

m arkedly from his contem poraries o f the Second International.
approach takes the

His

form of a ruthless critique of "economism," which is

the term Gramsci uses to describe various forms o f reductionist
M arxism.

In particular, Gram sci's attack against reductionism takes the

form o f prison notes written against Bukarin's historical m aterialism .
W ithin the pale o f M arxist thought the methodology o f historical
m aterialism has taken on a variety o f meanings.

In the first chapter of

the present essay, Robert Cox's historical m aterialist method was
addressed. Here I step back in history and outline a reading of the
theory of historical materialism expressed in Karl M arx’s "Preface" to A,
Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy (1859/1968).
paragraphs composing the

The

1859 "Preface" offer a doctrine which

divides the human world into spheres o f production and relations of
production (economic base) and the legal, political, artistic, moral
norms, and etc (ideological superstructure).
the ideological, or

In this theory changes in

superstnictural, elements of society are social

responses to contradictions existing between the mode o f production
and the relations of production.

One senses a one-way determinism in
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the theory as institutional and political changes are presented as
reflections of changes in the economic base.
In the social production o f their life, men enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent
o f their will, relations of production which correspond to a
definite
stage o f the development of their material
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
roduction constitutes the economic structure o f society, the
real foundations, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consciousness. . . . It is not the consciousness o f men
that determ ines their being, but, on the contrary, their
social being that determ ines their consciousness (1968:
181).
In this doctrine it is understood that at certain conjunctural points in
history the superstructure

"comes into conflict with" developm ents in

the economic base (Marx, 1968: 181).
cause a rapid transform ation o f the
process o f

Changes in the economic base
superstructure.

And during this

change, or as Marx calls it, "epochal revolution,"

superstructural
progressive.

elem ents

either decay

o r becom e

historically

Thus, in times o f revolution the one-way determinism o f

production processes generating social consciousness gives way to the
possibility of a two-way causality.

In other words, during periods of

societal transform ation, changes in the economic base effect changes
in the superstructure, which in turn affect further changes in the
base.

At these conjunctural periods consciousness becomes a

d e term in in g

facto r.
In considering such transform ations a distinction should
always be made between the material transform ation o f
the economic conditions o f production, which can be
determ ined with the precision o f natural science, and the
legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic—in
short ideological forms in which men become conscious of
this conflict and fight it out (1968: 182).

H ow ever

in assessing revolutionary consciousness

Marx insists

that one

must explain it "from the the contradictions o f material life, from the
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existing conflict between the social productive forces (mode of
production) and the relations of production" (1968:

182).

Although

ideology becomes a weapon, or tool, for revolutionary forces, ideology is
intimately connected with contradictions in the economic base.
In light of the primacy o f the economic base Marx offers two
propositions
societal

that reem phasize

the econom ically

determ ined

nature

of

change.
No social order ever perishes before all the productive
forces for which there is room in it for development have
developed; and new higher relations o f production never
appear before the m aterial conditions for their existence
have matured in the room o f the old society itself.
Therefore mankind always sets itself such tasks as it can
solve. . . (1968: 182).

Underlying this theory is a teleological view o f society.
transform ation

The

which Marx addresses here is the transform ation from

Capitalism to Socialism.

And, in the history o f mankind,

socialist

transform ation appears as a final human realization (1968: 182).

Despite

the ability o f superstructural elements to act as a force in themselves,
they cannot be a force for themselves.
structure

determ ines,

although

In the final analysis economic

dialectically,

form s

o f consciousness.

It was, at least in part, M arx’s emphasis on economic structure
that propelled a wave of M arxist thinkers and practitioners to view
social change in almost mechanical terms.
in the economic base

In a generic sense, changes

exacerbate contradictions between economic

structure and ideological superstructure.

These contradictions come to a

head in revolution through which the base and superstructure are
reharm onized.

However,

such a generic form ulation o f historical

materialism overlooks M arx’s claim that it is through ideological
structures that "men become conscious o f this conflict and fight it out"
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(1968:

182).

G ram sci's

We may use this general problem as a point of entry into

M arxiam.

By the conclusion of World W ar I, Marxism, as a theory and
strategy for societal transform ation, had entered a period o f protracted
crisis.

It seemed as if capitalism was infinitely malleable, able to

overcome periods of crisis and regenerate itself in new cancerous
form s—especially fascism.

The old Marxism which

emphasized the

primacy of economic conditions failed to grasp the seemingly
regenerative powers of capitalism .
became a central concern.

W ithin M arxist circles this problem

However the 1920's and

response to this weakness in the Marxist approach .

1930’s witnessed a
New neo-Hegelian

form of Marxism, articulated by Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci (to name a
few), em phasized the need for better understandings o f proletariat
consciousness (Boggs, 1984:

153).

Carl Boggs notes that the new

M arxists "sought to demonstrate that the stabilization o f capitalism could
not be understood without looking closely at the unfolding o f working
class existence" (1984:

155).

This examination o f proletarian

consciousness calls for a reconsideration o f the traditional form ulation
of M arxist analysis of
existence.

levels o f societal integration, or spheres o f

As already discussed the old Marxism breaks society into

spheres o f base and superstructure.
m aterialism

In this basic model o f historical

society is formed at three levels—economic structure, civil

society, and state.

The economic structure is the base upon which civil

society and the state are built.

These latter superstructural societal

elem em ts

o f underlying

emerge

and technologies.

as

reflections

econom ic

relationships

32
Gramsci's critique o f the basic model of historical m aterialism
involves at least three movements.
"econom ism "--a euphemism

for Bukarin's sociology in particular,

reductionistic Marxism in general.
revamping o f "ideology."

The first movement is a critique of
and

The second movement is a thorough

And, the third

movement is reconsideration

of the roles of the state and civil society in Marxist theory.

By rejecting

strict economic determinism as well as integrating civil society into the
realm of determinate forces, Gramsci's Marxism calls for a thorough
reexam ination o f not only our intellectual understandings o f how
society works, but also this approach redresses the role of activism in
affecting

social

change.

Gramsci's critique of economism is spelled out most clearly in the
essays "The M odem Prince" and "Problems in Marxism".

Here he

attacks past form ulations of historical economism for utilizing
essentially
social

structural

change. *

econom ic m echanism s to predict and understand

In particular Gramsci sites three characteristic

weaknesses o f the approach.

First, "in the search for historical

connections it makes no distinction between what is 'relatively
permanent' and what is a passing fluctuation. . . ." (1971:

163).

He

attacks "historical economism" for failing to pay adequate attention to
the complexity of economic class formations.

Second, historical

economism reduces economic developm ent to the "course o f technical
change in the instruments of work" (1971:
econom ism

proposes that both

"economic

163).

And, third, historical

and historical developm ent

* G ram sci distinguishes betw een historical "econom ism "—crude
reductionistic M arxism —and h istorical m aterialism —which is a more
complex understanding of the interplay of material forces found in
M arx's own writings.
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are made to depend directly on the changes in some important element
of production . . . which necessitate the new application of methods in
the construction and design o f machines” (1971:

163).

With each of

these ideas of historical economism Gramsci finds an array of problems.
Summing up the essentially weak position o f
G ram sci

historical economism

proclaim s:
In its most widespread form as economistic superstition,
the philosophy o f praxis loses a great part o f its capacity
for cultural expansion among the top layer o f intellectuals,
however much it may gain among the popular masses and
second-rate intellectuals. . . . They forget the thesis that
which asserts that men become conscious o f fundamental
conflicts on the level o f ideology is not psychological or
m oralistic in character, but structural and epistem ological;
and they form the habit of considering history as a
continuous marche de dupes, a competition in conjuring
and sleight of hand (1971: 164).

In this passage Gramsci highlights
M arxism

to

grapple

with

unw illingness o f econom istic

superstructural

elem ents—especially

p o litics—

and its consequent ignorance of the role of ideology in affecting
societal change.

W ith economism politics becomes a "marche o f dupes"

guided by illusions.

By contrast, Gramsci suggests that

although

economism has been presented as an "objective principle of
interpretation (objective scientific)," it too is a product o f history (1971:
165). Against the objective laws o f history proposed in economistic
Marxism Gramsci claims that all knowledge is rooted in history:
know ledge

is only understandable

within

a historic

all

framework.

R egarding the economistic discovery of "regularity," "law," and "
'autom atism ' in history"

Gramsci states:

It is not a question of 'discovering' a metaphysical law of
'determ inism ', or even o f establishing a 'general' law of
causality. It is a question o f bringing out how in historical
evolution relatively perm anent forces
are constituted
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which operate with a certain regularity
(1971: 412).

and automatism

The notion of "bringing out" the historical interplay of "forces" in the
historical process suggests that instead of rigid laws existing in an
extra-historical sense, the very workings of interactive forces occurs
within the plane of history.

Another essential point here is the notion

of "how in historical evolution relatively perm anent forces are
constituted . . . ."

In the Gramscian force model economic forces are

only one set of forces interacting with "political" and "military" forces.
Again, Gramsci attempts to avoid reductionism, especially in the
direction of economic determinism. One essential aspect o f Gramsci's
anti-reductionism

is the invigoration o f "ideology" w ithin M arxism.

A second movement in Gramsci's Marxism consists of a
reworking of the role of ideology in Marxist analysis.

W ithout doubt the

question of ideology may be considered a problematic within
frameworks.
sensitive.

Marxist

And, it is a problematic to which Gramsci was particularly

In a section of the essay "The Study of Philosophy" Gramsci

outlines the econom istic interpretation of ideology as "pure
appearance"

which

is

"distinct from"

underlying

econom ic

structures

and incapable o f changing basic structural tendencies (1971:

376).

By

contrast Gramsci's use of ideology suggest that ideological views o f the
world

are neither epiphenom enal nor false consciousness

1979:

185).

(M ouffe,

Instead ideology is the ground "on which men move,

acquire consciousness o f their position, [and] struggle" (1971:

377).

Gramsci reminds the reader that the study of ideology ought to begin
with M arx's 1859 "Preface."
The proposition contained in the "Prefacef"]. . . to the
effect that men acquire consciousness of structural
conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered as
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an affirm ation o f epistem ological and not simply
psychological or moral value. From this, it follows that the
theoretical-practical principle o f hegem ony has also
epistemological significance. . . . The realisation o f a
hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new
ideological terrain, determ ines a reform in consciousness
and of methods o f knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a
philosophical fact (1971: 365-366)
By contrast to variations of Marxism which considered ideology
as an illusory m irror reflecting upon the real economic substructure,
Gramsci's Marxism attempts to remove ideology from the realm o f
illusion.

He defines ideology in a broad sense.
One might say "ideology" here, but on the condition that
the word is used in the highest sense o f the conception of
the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in
economic activity and all m anifestations of individual and
collective life (1971: 372).

W ithin this Gramscian analysis all world views are necessarily
ideological.

Ideology consists of conceptions o f the world found in all

social products.

If all world-views are ideological then all forms of

consciousness contain ideology. And, it follows that if all forms o f
consciousness contain ideology then all forms of politics are essentially
ideological (Mouffe, 1979:

186).

Thus, there is no way out of ideology.

However, Gramsci does distinguish between critically
uncritical, or

unreflective, forms o f ideology.

reflective and

W ith predictable

Gramscian wit, he calls uncritical ideologies, or ideologies o f every day
life, "common sense," and critical historically based ideologies "good
sense."

Beyond distinguishing between

critical and uncritical w orld

views, Gramsci also discusses the degree o f uniformity of ideology
within a social formation.

Gramsci uses the notion of an "organic

ideology," or the ideologies "necessary to a given structure," to describe
the socially prevalent mode of thinking (1971:

376).
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Gramsci's insistence on the reality o f ideology follows from his
general epistemological approach.

As a heart felt M arxist, with slightly

H egelian leanings, Gramsci views hum anity as strictly a historical
product.

In a letter from Prison to his wife, Gulia, he writes, "I . . . think

that man is formed completely by history, through coercion (though
this should not be understood only as external violence or brutality) and
I believe only that."^ However his view o f humanity as strictly a
historical product varies from economistic Marxism in as much as
humanity is understood as the the product o f the "ensemble o f
relations."

That is the totality o f human relations—not ju st economic

production relations.

It is in this sense that Gramsci speaks of ideology

as a "material force"(1971:

165).

Carl Boggs emphasizes this point in

The T w o R evolu tion s:

For Gramsci, ideas, beliefs, cultural preferences, and even
myths and superstitions possess a certain m aterial reality
of their own since in their power to inspire people towards
action they interact with economic conditions, which
otherw ise would be nothing more than empty abstractions.
In other words, the contradictions o f capitalist society do
not 'explode' but are actualized and even manipulated by
human will power (1984:
158).
A third move in Gramsci's reformulation o f Marxism is the
categorical movement o f civil society from the economic base to the
superstructure.

This

movem ent necessitates

a thorough

reexam ination

o f the superstructure as an integral and essential element in Marxism.
A fter all, in the Gramscian perspective, it is the institutions of civil
society—the church,

fam ily

structure, political

the m edia—that articulate a world
challenges

State apparatuses.

parties, trade

unions,

view that either supports or critically
A

statem ent of Gramsci's reinterpretation

2 Letter to Gulia, December 1929.

Cited in Davidson (1977:

248).
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of the placement of civil society in
essay

Marxist analysis can be found in the

"The Intellectuals."
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major
superstructural "levels":
the one that can be called "civil
society", that is the ensemble o f organisms commonly
called "private", and that of "political society" or "the
state". These two levels correspond on the on hand to the
function of "hegemony" which the dom inant group
exercises throughout society and on the other hand that of
"direct domination" or command exercised through
through the State and juridical government (1971:
12).

Gramsci distinguishes between the overt domination at the level of the
State and the "hegemony" exercised by dominant groups through
mechanisms working at the level of civil society.
distinguishing betw een

More than

varieties o f pow er articulated

in

superstructural form ations, Gramsci's inclusion of civil society as a
layer in the superstructure allows for the possibility o f developing a
dialectic logic betw een the levels o f superstructural power
relationships.

In

this approach civil society provides

the "private"

basis for consent,

and the State reinforces that consent

with the force of

prisons and law.

However, the notion that the private

institutions of

civil society and the State can share the same interests supposes that
they share common world view.

The formation o f that common world

view is accounted for by Gramsci's theory o f hegemony.
The theory o f hegemony found in Gramsci's writings appears to
have passed through two phases.

In the first phase Gramsci's use of

hegemony is similar to the Leninist conception o f a class alliance.

In

this sense one class acts in the interest of another class for political
purposes (Mouffe and Laclau:
Southern Question"

1985,

Adamson:

1980).

In the essay "The

Gramsci refers to an alliance between classes which
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is similar to the Leninist use o f hegemony (Paggi, 1979;

Mouffe, 1979).

G ram sci claims:
But the important thing to note here is that the
fundamental concept of the Turin communists was not the
'magical formula' of dividing the big estates, but rather the
political alliance between Northern w orkers and Southern
peasants to oust the bourgeoise from State power (1978:
442).
The class alliance use o f hegemony is incorporated into the
second phase of Gramsci's theory. In the Prison
outlines

N otebooks Gramsci

a schem atic understanding of hegemony

the dialectic of State and civil society relations.

as

articulated through

In the second use,

hegemony refers not only to a unity of perceived interests, but also it
refers to a unity of perceptions.

Thus, hegemony refers simultaneously

to class, moral, and intellectual alliances.
in Gramsci"

In "Hegemony and Ideology

Mouffe rem arks that hegemony "becomes the indissoluble

union o f political leadership and intellectual and moral leadership,
which clearly goes beyond a class alliance" (1979:

179).

This second

use suggests that hegemony is not overt domination by the ruling
classes.

Instead, hegemony is a universalization the dominant class'

world views.

Jacque Texier describes the world view o f a hegemonic

class in terms o f internalization of regime norms:

"[I]n all domains of

human activity—w hether it be educational theory or politics--a type of
conduct which is initially imposed by force, may subsequently be freely
accepted by the subject himself.

Discipline becomes self-discipline,

coercion becomes self-governm ent" (1979:

73).

One cannot overly stress the distinction between dom ination and
hegemony in Gramsci's writings.

Hegemony is a function o f a unity of

world views articulated through civil institutions.

By contrast

domination is pow er asserted directly by State apparatuses.

In one
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telling passage Gramsci states: "the general notion o f the State includes
elements which need to be referred back to civil society (in the sense
that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other
words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)" (1971:

263).

On

the one hand the legal political society provides force, and , on the
other hand, civil society provides the consensual basis for legitim izing
State power.

And, although hegemonic power presupposes the

universalization o f the dom inant group's w orld view, the m aintenance
o f hegem ony requires a continuing limited consensual "give and take"
relationship between the rulers and the ruled. That is the dominant
groups must take into account the interests o f the dominated groups to
m aintain power.

But the concessions the ruling group makes to the

ruled groups can only be of a lim ited "economic-corporate" kind.
Concessions that actually changed the real power position of the
dom inated groups would undermine the existing power o f the dominant
g ro u p .
Undoubtedly the fact o f hegemony presupposes that
account be taken o f the interests and the tendencies of the
groups over which hegemony is exercised, and that a
certain com prom ise equilibrium should be form ed--in
other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices
of an economic-corporate kind (Gramsci, 1971:
161).
Gramsci notes that such compromises cannot be o f an "essential kind"
(1971:

161).

That is, the "give and take" process between the dominant

group and the subordinate groups cannot sacrifice the basic interests o f
the dominant group.

The notion here is that a hegemonic power

configuration must be flexible enough to allow for m inor "sacrifices"
by pow er holders to m aintain the basic support of subordinate groups.
If such concessions are made within the confines o f the hegemonic
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belief system —the values of the dominant groups—then ideological
support for the dominant group is not undermined.
The process whereby the world view of the ruling groups
becomes the universal world view involves an interplay o f forces at
three levels of society:

production, civil society, and the State.

Gramsci

explains the interrelation of these societal levels in terms o f "relations
of force" existing in various "moments or levels."

Like any ardent

M arxist, Gramsci’s analysis of the relations of force begins with
production.

Thus, the first level of force is the relation o f "social

forces" which, "is closely linked to the structure, objective, independent
of human will, and can be measured with the systems of the exact
physical sciences" (1971:

180).

These "social forces" represent the

cornerstone o f the econom istic Marxism Gramsci criticizes at length.
And, although Gramsci sees even the physical sciences as rooted in
history, they exist independent of "human will."

That is "social forces"

are part of an underlying objective reality. And, as in most Marxist
analysis "social forces" exist at the level of the economic base.
The second level of forces in the Gramscian analysis are "political
forces."

Political forces represent the "evaluation o f the degree of

hom ogeneity,

self-aw areness,

social classes" (1971:
superstructure.

181).

and

organisation

attained

by the

various

At this level of force the analysis enters the

Here one should note that Gramsci locates political

parties at the level o f civil society, and, consequently, in the
superstructure.

In the Gramscian analysis political forces appear to be

key in understanding the hegemony or lack thereof within a nation
state.

A fter all, Gramsci discusses political forces in terms o f the

"hom ogeneity,"

"self-aw areness,"

and organization

o f social classes.
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Thus, it is through political channels that persons develop class
consciousness and social solidarity.
The third level of forces which Gramsci discusses are m ilitary
forces.

Like political forces, military forces are located in the

superstructure.

But unlike political forces which are located in the

sphere of civil society, military forces are located with the state
apparatus.
social

If, on the one hand, political forces in civil society generate

"self-aw areness"

and varying

degrees o f societal

"hom ogeneity"--

the bases for social consent--, then, on the other hand, the State's
control o f military forces provide the tools to enforce the perceived
societal consensus.

Although the role of military forces appear less

central in the Gramscian analysis than political forces, his analysis
suggests that the "relation of military forces . . . [is] from time to time . . .
directly decisive" (1971:

183).

"Social forces" are given by history and "military forces" are
controlled by the State apparatus.
"political forces."

In between these forces rest

It is with political forces that Gramsci attempts to

explain the possibility for hegemony within a society.

As mentioned

above political forces represent the degree of "homogeneity" and "selfawareness" within a nation-state.

Corresponding to three levels o f

force, Gramsci posits three levels of articulation of political force.

The

first level of political force is found in the relationships among
members o f a social class.

Here members of one class identify with

other members of the same class
social classes.

but feel no solidarity with the other

Gramsci calls this level o f political force the "economic-

corporate" phase (1971:
the following way:

181).

He describes consciousness at this level in
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The first and most elementary o f these is the economiccorporate level: a tradesman feels o b lig e d to stand by
another tradesm an, a m anufacturer by another
m anufacturer, etc., but the tradesman does not yet feel
solidarity with the manufacturer; in other words, the
members of the professional group are conscious o f its
unity and homogeneity, and the need to organise it, but in
the case of the wider social group this is not yet so (1971:
181).
The

second moment o f

sense of intraclass "obligation"
solidarity for members

political consciousness occurs where the
gives way to a sensation o f interclass

of all social classes.

At this moment in the

development of class consciousness the sense o f solidarity is still an
economic solidarity. But the realization o f interclass generalized
solidarity allows for movement within a class towards achieving lim ited
political goals.

In particular, subordinate classes may begin to seek

"juridical" or legal

equality with the dominant class.

Already at this juncture the problem o f the State
but only in terms o f winning politico-juridical
with the ruling groups:
the right is claimed to
in legislation and adm inistration, even to reform
but w ithin the existing fundam ental structures
(Gramsci, 1971: 181).
Three points are
political consciousness.

worthy

is posed—
equality
participate
these—

o f note regarding the second phase of

First, Gramsci refers to this phase as a

"juncture,"

hence, he isimplying that this phase is transitional.

not reflect

a permanent or, in Gramscian language, "organic" level of

political consciousness.

It does

Second, although procedural reform is possible

at this level, such reform occurs within "existing fundamental
structures." This suggests that

the inclusion o f subordinate classes in

the political process occurs on the tu rf o f the ruling class—using their
legal code, their State mechanism.

And, third, Gramsci notes that the

"problem of the State is posed" at this level.

Here the solidarity achieved

within subordinate classes comes into contact with the State apparatus;
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hence, at this level one sees a link between developing class
consciousness and the ability to confront the State, even where such
conflict occurs within

the State's "politico-legal" system.

The third level of political consciousness represents the
hegemonic moment o f

political consciousness.

At this level the limits o f

interclass economic solidarity is transcended by the "awarefness] that
one's own corporate interests, in their present and future developm ent,
transcend the limits of the purely economic class and can and must
become the interests of other subordinate groups too" (1971:

181).

this level of political class consciousness the entire set o f interests
various subordinate groups are fused into

At
of

a set o f common interests.

It

is the formation of a complete set (e.g., not just economic interests) of
interclass common interests that rest as a precondition for hegemonic
power.

More than a sense of transclass solidarity o f

notion of

interests the

hegemonic political consciousness suggests a universalization

o f perception o f interest.
[I]t is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies
become "party", comes into confrontation and conflict,
until only one of them, or at least a single combination of
them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to
propagate itse lf throughout so c ie ty -b rin g in g about not
only a unison of economic and political aims, but also
intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions
around which the struggle rages not on a corporate level
but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the
hegemony o f a fundamental social group over a series of
subordinate social groups (Gramsci, 1971: 181-182).
In this passage Gramsci spells out the workings o f hegemony at the
level o f political consciousness.

It is worthy of note that he emphasizes

a perception o f the attainment o f a " 'universal' plane" for hegemonic
authority.
interests

The notion o f universality implies that particular class
have been superseded by

"universal" understanding o f the
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world.

Further, he remarks that hegemony is held by a " 'fundamental'

social group over a series of subordinate groups."
The ability of a class to assert hegemonic authority depends on a
combination of forces which make possible the supersession of
"econom ic-corporative"

interests

by

"universal"

interests.

The

articulation of the dom inant class’ interests as universal interests is
made possible through the institutions of civil society.

In a sense the

education system, family structure, exchange norms, media, and (of
special interest to Gramsci) political parties act as cultural mediation
mechanisms between the dominant social class and the other groups it
dominates.

Thus, in the Gramscian perspective control of the

institutions civil society becomes central to understanding State power.
It is through these institutions, especially political parties, that groups
gain the know ledge

and organizational

structures that either m aintain

or challenge State power.
Gramsci's interest in the role o f politics in general, and political
parties in particular, for affecting social transform ation should not be
underestim ated.

His emphasis on the role o f the relationship between

civil society and the state suggests that political activity channelled
through civil institutions offers a powerful point o f entry for
su p e rstru c tu ra l

a n aly sis.

The problem will therefore be that o f establishing the
dialectical position o f political activity and of the
corresponding science) as a particular level of
superstructure.
One might say, as a first approximation,
that political activity is precisely the first moment or first
level. . . (Gramsci, 1971: 137).
At the level of politics the role o f political parties becomes a key concept
in Gramsci's work.

After all it should be remembered that Gramsci was

not only a complex Marxist philosopher, but also he was an activist.
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Prior to being imprisoned by M ussolini Gramsci's life effort had been
concentrated into the form ation and running o f the Italian Communist
Party.

As a party strategist, Gramsci recognized two distinct paths

political parties might follow for attaining national power.
path is that of a "war of position."
manoeuvre."

The first

The second path is a "war of

These two paths correspond to the relative developm ent o f

civil institutions within the nation-state.

The strategy of a "war o f

position" is applicable to the W estern nations with well developed civil
institutions with deeply embedded bourgeoise values.

In these nations

an open frontal assault against the State is impossible; thus, revolution
is affected by means of a "tactical and informal penetration" o f civil
society (Adamson, 1980:

10).^

Adamson describes the logic o f the "war

of position" as follows:
Such a revolution would be an extended campaign for
hegemonic influence among the population at large; once
this was attained, political power would be essentially at
hand and many o f the conditions of the socialism would
already have been realized.
In this sense, the tragectory
of war of position can be plotted as a single unified
m ovem ent spanning pre-dom ination, dom ination, and
post-domination stages (1980: 225).
In the situation o f highly developed civil institutions which support the
State, the other strategy, a "war o f manoeuvre" becomes impossible.

By

contrast to the "war o f position" and its gradual infiltration and
subversion of of the old institutions o f civil society, the "war of

3 Regarding the entrenched nature of the power structures in
the industrial democracies Gramsci remarks:
"The massive structures of
the m odem democracies, both as state organizations and as complexes of
association in civil society, constitute the art of politics as it were the
'trenches' and their permament fortifications o f the front in a war of
position, they render merely 'partial' the elem ent o f movement which
before used to be the 'whole' of war, etc" (1971: 243).
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manoeuvre" represents a frontal assault on the State—a condition o f
overt warfare (Gramsci, 1971:

238-238; Adamson, 1980

: 225-228).

This

approach is suitable in countries with only partially developed civil
institutions and a lack of value consensus between the State apparatus
and the limited civil institutions (Adamson, 1980; Girling, 1982;
1971:

Gramsci,

243).
Throughout Gram sci's prison w ritings the notion o f hegemony

recurs.

It is both an analytical as well as strategic concept.

strategic

concerns, G ram scian hegemony

understanding o f power.

suggests

Beyond

a unique

It is an understanding o f power which draws

on both subjective and objective conditions.

B elief systems articulated

and reified through the web o f social relations not only support but also
create understandings o f power.

These culturally centric

understandings of power are expressed in terms o f levels o f hegemonic
development within a society, and they are enforced with the legal and
military apparatuses of the State.

Together the economic substructure,

civil society and the State form a "historic bloc"—"i.e., unity between
nature and spirit (structure and superstructure) unity o f opposites and
distincts" (1971:

137).^

Again, it should be stressed that Gramsci

proposes that only a "fundamental class" can become hegemonic (1971:
161).

Thus in the search for understanding the possibilities of

4 Gramsci also addresses the idea of "historic bloc" in the
follow ing way:
"Structure and superstructure form an ’historic bloc.'
That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant e n se m b le of the
superstructures is the reflection of the e n s e m b le of the social relations
of production" (1971: 366). Further it is worthy of emphasis that
Gramsci uses the word "ensemble" to stress the multiplicity and
complexity of varied social relations.
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hegemony within a nation-state, or even among the community o f
nation-states, the possible forms o f hegemony are limited. ^
Gramsci's discussions of the possibilities of a class becoming
hegemonic are, for the most part, limited to nation-state examples.

In

particular he writes extensively about the possibilities o f forming a
potentially hegemonic communist party in Italy.

The whole thrust of

"The M odem Prince" is an examination of the history of Italian politics,
the particular problem s within Italy—e.g., the rise of Italian fascism
and the lack of a "national popular will"—, and the development o f a
particular form of Italian Communist party capable o f not only creating
class interests

but also o f universalizing its ideology.

Further in the

essay "Americanism and Fordism" Gramsci writes of an emerging "cult
of efficiency" in the United States where "Fordism" is perceived to have
ushered in a whole new era of values, beliefs, and political strategies to
facilitate

"rationalised" production.

However, there are other passages

in Gramsci's writings that show quite clearly that he perceived the
possibility of international hegemony.

The possibilities for the

form ation o f an international hegemony are sketched, but not spelled
out, in the Prison

N otebooks.

Entering a discussion o f international relations and Gramsci it is
wise to reem phasize the distinction between Gram scian

5 It is essential to consider the problem that across nation-state
d iffem t classes are fundam ental—e.g. m anagerial, capitalist, landlord,
peasant—according to the level o f economic formation.
W hat are the
im plications o f this for forming an international hegemony.
Cox
argues that the transnational m anagerial class could become hegemonic
in a Western bloc (Cox, 1985), but could such a class universalize its
point-of-view in agricultural economies? Here it seems that domination
is possible but not hegemony. Hegemony would require a unity of
outlooks across cultures.
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hegem ony,"ideological"
word.

As

hegemony, and other traditional uses o f the

spelled out in the first chapter o f this essay, traditional

international relations theory uses the word hegemony to mean the
ability o f one nation-state to dominate the international system due to
its preponderance of m aterial resources.

These traditional theories

examine interstate relations at the level o f State interaction (State as
actor assumption) as confined by an international structure.
assumptions are incom patible with the Gramscian approach.

Such
First,

Gramscian hegemony is generalized consent protected by the ability to
use force.

In the Gramscian approach hegemony is, by definition, a

product o f civil society.

It is the institutions of civil society that

articulate the dominant class' world view.

Second, since hegemony

resides at the level of civil society, any discussion o f international
politics that excludes

the interw orkings of a nation-state cannot discuss

Gramscian hegemony.

To discuss Gramscian hegemony the "State as

actor" assumption would have to be violated.

Further, traditional

analysis does not distinguish between State and civil society.

One may

recall that Gramsci ascribes the function o f overt domination to the
State, and he places the function o f hegemony within civil society.
Thus, any discussion

of "ideological" hegemony in international

relations requires that the "State as actor" assumption is either
abandoned or,at least,

severely qualified.

(In terms of qualifying the

"State as actor" assum ption Robert Keohane's "modified research
program" offers one possible starting point.)

And, third, one essential

aspect o f Gramscian hegemony is the notion that understandings of
pow er change with degrees o f hegemonic developm ent and varieties of
fully articulated hegemony.

If one works from the position that
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understandings of power changes across time and through varied social
form ations, then the traditional assumption that "States seek power"
becomes foggy.
pow er directly

We can no longer impose the problems o f the Athenian
onto modern social structures.

Given these grand incom patibilities between Gramsci's use o f
hegemony and the way hegemony has been

used in traditional

literature, perhaps the clearest way o f interjecting
"ideological"

hegemony into

international

an understanding of

relations theory, is an

exam ination o f G ram sci's understanding o f international politics.
contrast to orthodox approaches, especially W altz's "structural

In
realism ,"

that view State action as constrained within an international system —
an "outside-in"

approach—G ram sci's

analysis follows

an "inside-out"

method.
Gramsci introduces the way in which one could develop a theory
o f international hegemony in "The M odem Prince.”

Here he draws on

the "relations o f force" model and asserts that "[tjhese levels range from
the relations between international forces . . .
within society. . ." (1971:
international forces, he

176).

to the objective relations

Although Gramsci does not define

remarks that the discussion o f international

forces would include definitions of a "great power," remarks on the
"combination of States in a hegemonic system," and "the concept of
independence and sovereignty as far as small and medium powers are
concerned" (1971:

176).

And, he raises the question:

relations precede or follow
(1971:

176).

"Do international

(logically) fundam ental social relations?"

He answers this question in the following passage:
There can be no doubt that they [i.e., international
relations] follow.
Any organic innovation in the social
structure, through its tech n ical-m ilitary expressions,
m odifies organically absolute and relative relations in the
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international field too.
Even the geographical position of a
national State does not precede but follows (logically)
structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them
to a certain extent. . . . However, international relations
react both passively and actively on political relations (of
hegemony among the parties).
The more the immediate
economic life o f a nation is subordinated to international
relations, the more a particular party will come to
represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of
preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand. . . (1971:
176).
This passage is particularly insightful into Gramsci's perceptions of
international relations.
expression

occurring

among states.

First, social changes o f a
w ithin

a nation-state

changes

"m ilitary-technical”
the

relations

Thus, the "organic" or "relative" relations among states

are effected by changes internal to a State.

Second, the relationship

between international relations and national politics is two-fold.
one hand,

On the

the greater the degree o f dependence between a national

economy and the international economy, or a dominant sector in it, the
more a political party is encouraged to "represent" this fact as a means
of attaining power.

And, on the other hand, by claiming to represent

the international interests o f the nation such a party represents "not so
much the vital forces of its own country, as that countries
subordination and economic enslavem ent to the hegemonic nations. . .
"(1971:177).

The link drawn between national party politics

and

international politics involves appeals to both the "popular will" of
nation and the reality of that nation's "economic enslavement."
party

a
The

seeking pow er utilizes the nation's international position to

encourage mass support for itself, yet, sim ultaneously, the support
generated by such a party fosters the interests o f other dominant
nations.

This is the fashion in which Gramsci outlines the possibilities

for international hegemony.

And, in a sense, he enters through an

economic window.
In another section of the Prison

N otebooks

Gramsci discusses

"Hegemony of W estern culture over the Whole World" (in "Problems in
Marxism").

Here Gramsci depicts the W estern world as gaining

w orldwide ideological hegem ony through the universalization o f a
belief system which "culminated in Hegel and the critique o f
Hegeliansim" (1971:

416). He claims that both intellectuals and activists

have become absorbed in a cultural process that concludes with
historical m aterialism and the "philosophy o f praxis" [Marxism].
these movements arose

From

"a new way of conceiving the world. . . [which]

tends. . . to become a popular, mass phenomenon, with a concretely
w orld-wide character, capable o f m odifying (even if the result includes
hybrid

com binations)

consciousness" (1971:

popular thought
417).

and m um m ified

popular

This modem consciousness which arose

from the popularization of German philosophy gives rise, as "the
crowning point of all previous history," to thoroughly historical modes
o f thinking—especially M arxism and humanism (1971:

417-418). ^

Perhaps Gram sci’s most telling passage in regards to his belief in
the possibilities of international hegemony is found in "The Study of
Philosophy."

In a section entitled " ’Language', Languages and Common

Sense" he tackles the problem o f "educational doctrine and practice"

6 The degree to which Hegelianism, in one form or another, had
perm eated the "popular consciousness" of W estern Europe in the 1920's
remains an open question.
Certainly among academic circles Hegel and
his disciples had become well known.
However, academics are only
one elem ent of the civil complex which articulates hegemonic power.
It
is doubtful that a Hegelian world view was assimilated into the belief
systems of all social classes manipulating civil society in Gramsci's Italy.
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(1971:

350).

He proposes that our understandings of education should go

well beyond "scholastic" concerns to the level o f any social relation
where there are leaders and lead (1971:
education

350).

He then suggests that

is inherently encom passed within the workings o f

hegem onic

relatio n s:
Every relationship o f 'hegemony' is necessarily an
educational relationship and occurs not only within a
nation, between the various forces o f which the nation is
composed, but in their international and world-wide field,
betw een com plexes o f national and continental
civilisations (1971: 350).

Gramsci appears to be asserting that international ideological
hegemony is not only a possibility, but also it is a real factor in
international affairs.

The notion o f hegemonic relationships as

educational relationships follows from position that hegemony is a
situation o f consent which is popularized through civil institutions.
Throughout the above discussion on Gramscian hegemony it was
stressed that hegemonic power is expressed through civil institutions.
At the level of the nation-state these institutions educate national
populations.

Moving to the level o f international relations one can

envision the civil society o f one nation learning from the civil societies
of other nations.
transference

From recent history one may consider: the

o f business m anagem ent

techniques

form

the

U nited

States to Japan and the Newly Industialized Nations; or the fusion o f
Am erican jazz music into American rock-and-roll music which was
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then transported to Britian and the European Continent.^
m ovem ents

represents

in tern atio n al

phenom enon

Each of these

o rig in atin g

w ithin

the civil society of one nation which has grown to international
proportion.

In no sense did these movements stem from the juridical

and legal apparatuses o f ’the State.
In the introduction to this chapter I suggested that Gramsci's
exposition of hegemony differs radically from its use in orthodox
international

relations

theory.

H opefully

made this point clear enough.

the

above

paragraphs

have

In the orthodox international relations

literature hegemony means one nation's ability to m aintain
international order due to its material preponderance.
w ritings

hegem ony

is

"national-popular"

consent

which

In Gramsci's
is

articulated

through civil institutions and protected by the state apparatus.
A lthough Gramsci speaks of hegemony prim arily in the national
context, he hints at international possibilities.

The movement from the

national level to the international level is, at best, problematic. (The
possibilities for incorporating a Gramscian theory o f hegemony into
International

relations literature,

and the lim itations o f that inclusion,

constitute the thrust o f the final chapter o f this essay.)

Regardless of

the problematic at hand, the Gramscian perspective is suggestive o f an
alternative model for understanding international power.

First, this

model would look inside the nation-state at the "relations of force"
7 The emphasis on education as the vehicle for transporting
hegem onic belief system s between nations offers a provocative pointof-entry for both the activist and the analyst.
For the analyist, the
eduactional approach would begin with cross exam ination o f "nationalpopular" beliefs articulated in different national civil institutions.
For
the activist, the notion o f gaining hegemony in the international
system would begin with an infiltration o f civil institutions that clearly
possess transnational links.
Here academia and the arts are possible
starting places.

among the social spheres.

Hegemony would be found within the nation

state where the beliefs and values o f the dominant class transcend class
boundaries and appear universal in nature.

Second, this model would

examine the relations of force across nation-states.

Here the analysis

would focus on the homogeneity of practices, beliefs, and values in
exchanges between nations.

Third, the model would look for a tendency

to w ards,or away from, international hegemony in terms o f the degree
o f development o f an international "ethical-political" plane.

Of course,

this model would pay attention to economic and military capabilities of
nation-states.

A fter all hegemony is consent protected by the "armour

of coercion."

Such a model of international power would, in a sense,

focus on the interplay of objective and subjective international forces.
On the objective side one could count guns and butter.

On the subjective

side one could attempt to articulate an intercultural theory o f belief
components o f power relationships.
I have also suggested that hegemony is not only an analytical
concept, but also it implies a strategy.

In this essay, I have not probed

deeply into the strategic im plications for the attainm ent o f hegemony.
How ever such a strategy would include the conscious recognition of the
following points:

First, Gramsci emphasizes the role o f political parties

as key elem ents in the developm ent of "counter hegemonic" belief
systems.

The way in which the party is structured and its membership

are of great importance.

Second,

the attainment of hegemony within a

State depends, at least in part, on the relative development of civil
institutions.
necessary.

In some nations a frontal assualt—"war o f m anouevre"— is
W hile in other countries the gradual transform ation o f

"popular beliefs"

through infiltration

into

the civil sphere—"war o f

position"—is the only plausible path to hegemony.
only attainable by a fundamental class.

Third, hegemony is

Fourth, the attainment of

hegemony depends upon an alliance o f forces;

that is the attainment o f

a hegemonic position requires the consent o f military, social, and
political forces.

And, fifth, Gramsci’s work provides only an outline.

The details of strategy for attaining hegemony depend not only upon
the developm ent of civil society within the nation, or between nations,
but also it depends upon the currently exiting levels of homogeneity o f
belief and value systems.

In this sense, an Gramscian

type strategy

calls for very careful planning and analysis prior to action.

Chapter III
Hegemony:

The Limitations and Possibilities for a Concept

W ithin the pale of orthodox international relations theory the
word hegemony is used to describe one nation's ability to dominate the
international system because o f its abundance of m aterial resources.

By

contrast the writings of Antonio Gramsci provide a theory o f hegemony
which locates hegemonic power within a dominant class' ability to
universalize its point of view.

Through the universalization o f a belief

system what may have appeared as domination appears as natural, or at
least consensual, under hegemonic leadership.

W ith Gramsci hegemony

becomes a linking concept that not only allows for an explanation o f
the ability o f capitalist social order to continually regenerate itself, but
also the theory o f ideological hegemony suggests certain strategies for
action. As argued in the first two sections o f this essay, there are points
o f convergence as well as divergence between Gramsci's theory o f
ideological hegemony and other theories of hegemonic rule.

Most

im portantly, Gram sci's emphasis on the potential power o f ideas adds an
irreplaceable elem ent o f subjectivity

to political pow er relationships.

However, the inclusion of ideas as a force in international politics may
appear a naive idea to readers who look at the world through traditional
international relations lenses.

In the paragraphs that follow I outline

some, but certainly not all, o f the problems and potentials for enriching
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our understandings o f international power with a theory o f ideological
hegemony.
Turning to questions o f strategy

two problematics come to mind.

First, what are the connections between Gramsci's ideological
hegemony and more traditional theories o f hegemony
G ram sic's

work

specialists?

appealing

to

Am erican

international

that could make
relations

Given the axiomatic differences of Gramsci's "theory o f

praxis" and orthodox analysis the incorporation o f a theory o f
ideological hegemony necessitates a w illingness to suspend theory
axioms.

And, second, beyond academic considerations, what would the

application o f a theory of ideological hegemony strategically suggest
for international actors.

For both of these problems its is useful to

think in terms of a "war of position."

In Gramsci’s writings the term

"war of position" is used to describe a strategy of a gradual infiltration
into the institutions of civil society wherein an em ergent "counter
hegemonic" belief system may be articulated.
civil institutions this

Once expressed through

"counter hegemonic" belief system may

undermine support for the dominant belief system.

At this level the

"war of position" for changing the mainstream use of the word
hegemony from dom ination to "consent protected by the armour of
coercion"

might begin, as does this essay, with an examination of the

various ways

hegemony has been used.

Examining literature on hegemony one is struck by two distinct
uses of the word.

The use of hegemony to mean a preponderance of

m aterial resources is little more than one way of defining domination.
In comparison to this use, hegemony also has a history on the political
left which appears richer in content.

In H egem ony

and

Socialist
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S trateg y Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe develop a "genealogy" of
hegemony which suggests that the the concept o f hegemony develops
in response to gaps in historical models o f power.
Even in its humble origins in Russian Social Democracy,
where it is called upon to
cover alimited area of
political
effects, the concept of 'hegemony' already alludes to a kind
of c o n tin g e n t intervention required by the crisis or
collapse of what would have been a 'normal' historical
development. Later, with Leninism, it is a keystone in the
new form of political calculation required by the
contingent 'concrete situations' in which class struggle
occurs in an age of imperialism. Finally, with Gramsci, the
term acquires a new type o f centrality that transcends its
tactical or strategic uses:
'hegemony' becomes a key
concept in understanding the very
unity existing in a
concrete social formation" (1985:
7).
The understanding o f hegemony as an organic

concept

developing w ithin a field o f historical struggle inspires the American
social critics Murray Bookchin (The M odem Crisis. 1986) and Carl Boggs
(Social M ovements and Political Pow er. 1986) to incorporate a Gramscian
use

of hegemony into their strategic analysis.

W ithin these current

works by Bookchin and

Boggs, not only is the word hegemony used to

describe the embedded

nature o f particular pow er configurations,

but

also the word hegemony is used to describe the method by which social
pow er can be transformed.

In particular, both o f these authors discuss

the possibilities o f the development of a "counter hegemony" to
confront existing power structures.
Aronowitz's

The Crisis

In a sim ilar vein Stanley

in Historical M aterialism (1981) draws upon

Gram sci’s theory o f hegemony to explain the possibilities o f
incorporating
outside

"New Forces for Liberation," movements arising from

historical M arxism —fem inism

and ecology politics

in particular-

-, into a broader re-examination o f the logic of capitalism (1981:
135).

133-

And, work by John Hargreaves (Sport Power and Culture. 1986)
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utilizes Gramsci's theory of hegemony to explain the ways in which the
English bourgeoise class uses sports to m itigate class tensions within
Britian.

Although this is only a partial list of current applications of

Gramscian hegemony to social analysis, the point is clear enough:

a

theory Gramsican hegemony has come of age to a variety of social
critics.
Robert Cox's model of "hegemony and production," Richard K.
A shly's model of "dialectical competence,"and Robert
N eorealist

research

program

relations theory where
G ram scian

theory. *

offer three

exam ples

Keohane's
in

international

scholars have commenced an exam ination of

Cox's uses a theory hegemony to explain one set of

links between institutions, forms o f state, and production processes.
Koehane calls for an examination of domestic politics, and he
em phasizes the im portance o f rules and institutions in international
politics.

Gramsci's theory o f ideological hegemony shares a great deal

with the "hegemony and production" approach.
N eorealism ideological hegemony emphasizes
international politics.

Like Keohane's
rules and institutions in

Although I doubt that Keohane envisages his

research as one moment in a war of position, his micro-adjustm ents to
an established approach represent the type of positioning that may
facilitate a closer look at institutions and rules in international affairs.
Sim ilarly, Cox and Ashly directly apply Gramsci in their international
relations theories.
expanded

theory

It should be stressed that the articulation of an
o f hegem ony

w ithin

international

relations

literature

1 Interestingly enough, Ashley's model o f "dialectic competence"
incorporates Gram scian hegemony as well as specific nuances of
G ram sci’s general theory—especially the role o f "organic intellectuals"
(1986: 294-296).
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is only one

moment of a process of reexamining understandings

of

international

politics.

useful

The theory o f "ideological" hegemony is

not only because it provides a broader, and perhaps more "realistic,"
understanding o f the logic o f power, but also Gramscian hegemony
suggests certain strategies for transform ing global politics.
strategy

begins

with

civil

in stitu tio n s—including

This

u n iversities.

As suggested in the first chapter of this essay orthodox
international relations
First, nation-states

theory

begins

follow ing

are the prim ary international actors.

nation-states act to maximize power.
nearly universal rationality.
realism "

with the

assum ptions.
Second, such

And, third, nation-states act

with

In the context o f W altz's "structural

the assum ptions o f international anarchy and nation-state self

help are added.
A Gramscian analysis of international relations would diverge
from the orthodox

approach at several key points.

Gramscian analysis

would consider the State as a

international

First,

although a

primary unit in

affairs, this approach would pay close attention to the

internal workings o f the State, the degree o f development o f civil
institutions, and the degree of alignment of the "relations o f force."
Thus, the Gramscian approach seeks to expand the concept o f the State.
W hile the traditional models would exclude, or give only secondary
consideration to, these intrastate factors, the Gramscian analysis would
depend, at least in part, on understandings of relations within the state.
K eohane's "modified research program" relaxes the "state as actor"
assum ption to allow for an exam ination of interstate and intrastate
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o rg a n iz a tio n s .2

Furthermore, the Gramscian analysis would emphasize

the developm ent of transnational institutions.
Second, the orthodox assumption of States as power seeking units
has become

widely contested in contemporary literature.

Following

a

movem ent in orthodox economic reasoning from the language of
"utility maximization" to "utility satisfaction" the works of

both W altz

and Keohane recognize that states do not necessarily at all times in
history attempt to maximize global power (Waltz, 1986:
1986b:

194).

127; Keohane,

Within the Gramscian perspective whether or not States

strive for maximal global power becomes a complex question involving
the alignm ent o f forces within the state, the alignment o f forces
between states, and a particular understanding o f power
-hegemdnic or otherwise.
theory of im perialism nor a

m aximization-

Gramsci does not articulate a thorough
complete model o f international relations;

hence, any remarks regarding G ram sci’s views on w hether or not
State's seek

maximum global power are pure extrapolation.

And,third, a Gramscian analysis would
universal "rationality" prior to analysis.

reject any assumption

of

Instead o f viewing rationality

as a given, "rational" behavior in international politics becomes part of

2 W altz's sympathetic critic, John Gerard Ruggie, contests the
exclusion o f all domestic considerations from structural analysis
because the "functional scope o f the international system will also vary,
depending upon the the hegemonic form o f state/society relations that
prevails internationally at any given time.
Therefore, the hegemonic
form o f state/society relations, or lack thereof, constitutes an attibute o f
the international system and can be used as a systems-level explanatory
variable" (1986:
147). Ruggie’s use of hegemony in terms o f
"state/society" relations incorporates, to some degree, a version of
"ideological" hegemony. That is, while Ruggie does not want to violate a
"state as actor" assumption, he recognizes that the capabilities o f the
actors in the international system change depending upon the degree
o f consensus w ithin the "state/society" complex.
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what needs to be explained.

Universal rationality would be one

possibility under a globally hegemonic social order.

That is, his theory

of ideology would allow for a universal ideology with a universal sense
of rationality within a fully developed form o f global "ideological"
hegemony.

Gramsci’s work points in the direction o f a historically

conditioned

understanding

of"rationality."

R ationality

prior to, or outside of, social relationships.
rational

does not exist

Instead rationality, and

behavior, derive meaning through a web of social

relationships.

Since rationality exist within this web o f historical

social relationships, the question o f what constitutes nation-state
rational

behavior must confront the

perceive

rationality.

ways in which historical subjects

G ram sci’s analysis o f the relations o f domestic forces within
international politics, and his emphasis on the subjective elem ents o f
power, offer two helpful insights for further developm ent o f a theory
of international relations.

If, on the one hand, orthodox international

relations theory has emphasized the

role of m aterial resources in

determ ining the relative power o f a

nation, then, on the other hand,

the

Gram scian analysis understands national power in term s o f the
interrelationship between subjective and objective forces.

On the

objective pole a Gramscian analysis would look at relative national
pow er in term s o f m aterial resources—the

quantifiable m aterial

resources emphasized in the orthodox approach.

On the subjective side

this model would examine the degree o f alignment between ideological
understandings o f the world within a society and the perception o f a
degree unity of world views across nation-states.

The greater the

degree of unity o f ideological perception within a society the closer that
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nation-state would be towards developing a national hegemonic social
formation.
accepted

The closer an ideology becomes to being universally
across the international system, the closer the international

system approaches a hegemonic order.

This approach would examine

the degree o f homogeneity of world views across nations as articulated
through the degree to which a nation-state's world view had been
universalized throughout the nation-state system.
In the Gramscian approach the mere possession of a relative
preponderance of "guns and butter" at the nation-state level (the
objective forces of a nation) is insufficient to explain national power.
To explain the relative power of a nation-state this model would add
subjective dim ensions o f pow er—the degree o f ideological unity
expressed through the social levels o f production, civil society, and the
State.

In turn, the degree of ideological unity within a State would

depend, at least in part, on the degree of unity of the levels of force
within the society.

Instead o f understanding nation-state pow er as a

function o f the quantifiable m aterial resources possessed by the nation
state, this model would account for these forces and then incorporate an
analysis of subjective power variables.

The understanding o f national
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power arrived at through this model depends ultimately on the degree to
which subjective

and objective forces are unified.^

In the orthodox literature a theory o f "hegemonic stability" is
used to argue that where one nation-state is powerful enough to
dominate the nation-state system cooperation is more likely.

In this

instance the possibilities for international order depend, at least in part,
on one nation-state possessing enough material pow er to m aintain a
particular international order.
condition within

Cox's analysis o f global hegemony as a

the international system where "social

of state," and "world

orders" exist

forces,"

with a high degree o f

"forms

unity offers an

alternative point o f entry for articulating a theory o f hegemonic
stability (Cox, 1986:

220-221).

While the orthodox model of hegemonic

stability focuses on m aterial pow er variables, Cox's approach examines
the relationship between m aterial forces ("social forces"), the
organization o f civil society and state complexes ("forms o f state"), and
the historic global "configuration o f forces" ("global orders") (1986:
220).

His model calls for an

states com posing

examination of the internal ordering of the

the international nation-state system.

However,

he

does not emphasize the role o f subjective forces to the extent that
Gramsci does.

Gramsci's emphasis on the degree o f homogeneity of

3 Keohane's critique of the theory o f hegemonic stability in A f te r
H e g e m o n y is one example o f an attempt to include subjective
dimensions o f power. He states: "Hegemony is defined as 'a situation in
which one nation is powerful enough to m aintain the essential rules
governing interstate relations and willing to do so* (Keohane and Nye,
1977, p. 44).
This interpretive
framework retains an emphasis on
power
but looks more seriously than the crude power theory at the internal
characteristics of the stong state.
It does not assume that strength
autom atically creates incentives
to project one's pow er abroad.
Domestic attitudes, political structures, and
decision making processes
are also important" (1984: 35).
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ideological perception, both within a nation-state and across the nation
state system, provides a essential insight for theories of power.

This is

not to say that Gramsci's approach discounts the importance o f material
forces.

Rather, material forces represent merely one layer o f an

expanded force model which includes "ideas" as articulated through
civil institutions at both the national and international level.
If one approaches the question o f the possibilities for developing
hegem onic belief system

through

international

civil society, then one

encounters the problem that an international civil society exists with
only

weakly

articulated

society is emerging.
com m unications

institutions.

C ertainly,

an international

civil

Its growth is fostered by the development o f

technology,

international organizations

m u ltin atio n al

corporations,

and

such as the W orld Bank, the International

M onetary Fund, and the United Nations.

Nevertheless, one may question

to what extent the developm ent of international civil institutions has
encouraged the developm ent o f an international
plane.

"political ethical"

W ithin Gramsci's writings the ability of a class to universalize its

world view largely depends upon the degree of developm ent and
support for the national civil society.

Thus, international institutions

would follow from highly developed national civil society.

That is, the

support for international institutions is predicated on the existence of a
set of domestic civil institutions.
uniquely

international

class--

For instance, Cox argues that a
an

international

business

m anagem ent

class—is evolving through which the beliefs and values o f a class can
become universalized.
international

hegem ony

Instead o f rooting the possibilities for
with

form al

international

in stitu tio n s,

emphasizes the development of an international class formation.

he
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The application of an "ideological" theory of hegemony could
enrich

orthodox

respects.

international

relations

analysis

in

several

Robert Cox's work provides an excellent starting point for

developing a Gramscian theory o f international hegemony.
analysis

significant

filters

hegem onic possibilities through the

Cox's

developm ent o f

hegemony in the technology and relations o f production (Cox, 1982).
Institutions serve to enforce or underm ine the com patibility o f these
relationships.

As in Cox's analysis, the possibilities for "ideological"

hegemony depend only in part on hegemony in production.

Further

determ inate factors include the level o f developm ent o f international
civil institutions, and the relationship between m ilitary forces and
these institutions.

The ability o f an emergent international class to

universalize its belief system requires a give and take bargaining
position with the m ilitary capabilities o f nation-states.
Since G ram sci’s use of hegemony emphasizes the subjective
elements of power, this approach would require deep analysis into the
interplay

betw een

international

structure

and

and

social

consciousness.

The extent to which social consciousness in general, and
understandings o f power in particular, depend upon the degree of
developm ent

and

a central concern.

alignm ent o f international

forces

necessarily

becom es

A fter all one aspect of a Gramscian analysis would

include a demonstration that ideas are, at least in part, molded by
institutional expressions.

In particular the approach would call for

analyses o f the ideologies expressed w ithin the existing international
civil institutions.
This approach would suggest not only that international
structure changes across time, as in Cox's model, but also it would impose
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a developm ental understanding o f international consciousness.
social

consciousness

consciousness
historically

w ithin

the

and international

developm ental

"ethical political" plane.

nation-state,

Like

international

structures may pass through

phases

culm inating

with

an

international

Here the notion o f global structure would be

used in Cox's sense of "world orders."

In contrast to the W altzain

approach that views historical changes within the nation-state system
existing w ithin a relatively static structural container, the notion of
"world orders" allows for the possibility that different historical periods
actually possess different global structures.
discusses the difference betw een pax

This is sense in which Cox

britianicia and pax

am ericana.

The world order during these two periods differs not only in terms of
which nations are dominant iri global politics, and the bi-polar or
m ulti-polar character of global politics, but also these periods differ
according to their "particular configuration of forces" (1986:

220).

Again, it should be stressed that although Cox’s work is useful for
structuring a Gramscian analysis, it relies more heavily on the role of
"social forces" than would a Gramscian model.

Remarking on the

m aterially driven nature of transform ation o f "world orders" Cox tells
the reader:

"Changes in the organization of production generate new

social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure o f
states; and the generalization o f changes in the structure o f states alters
the problematic of world order" (1986:

220).

And, finally, the Gramscian approach would usher in a dualistic
research

approach

for understanding

international

relations.

On

the

one hand it would emphasize the identification o f levels o f force—the
ways in which they are m anifest and their degree o f developm ent—at
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both the national and international levels.

On the one hand the

analysis would examine the varying degrees to which ideological
homogeneity is developed according to the alignment o f forces at the
national and international levels. Hegemonic global form ations could be
found

where

national

forces

are

internally

aligned

with

international

forces under the veil of a dominant global ideology.
The application of a model o f "ideological" hegemony to
international affairs im plies a greater degree of freedom for policy
m akers (at the international, national, and civil levels) to affect either
political change or stability. Instead of being constrained by the
current balance of powers, and relying on one nation's material
preponderance, to

assure relative global tranquility, the notion of

ideological hegemony implies that "ideas are m aterial forces," and,
consequently, that peace can be fostered by the articulation o f a world
view that encourages cooperation.

Although the inclusion o f ideas as a

force for understanding of international pow er was a central point in
Carr’s critique of "idealism",
state behavior.

one may argue that ideas do affect nation

Further, as compared to the global political situation

surrounding Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis , one aught consider the
relatively

greater degree o f international civil

transform ation

of

com m unications

technology

organization, the radical
resulting

in

an

abundance o f inform ation, and the transform ation o f global economic
structures

into

a highly

interdependent global economy as indicators

which further the pow er o f "ideas" in the current global situation.
D espite the actual transform ation o f the global economy, rapid
growth in com m unications technologies, and the developm ent o f a
lim ited international civil society, at least two problems hinder the
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pow er of policy m akers attem pting to m anipulate the international
system through applications of a model o f "ideological hegemony." In
an analytic sense nation-states are autonomous.

However the

assumption of nation-state autonomy is countered by cultural and
economic nation-state interdependence.

Second, the model of

"ideological" hegemony supposes a form o f historical relativism .

That

the "ruling ideas in every age are the ideas o f the ruling class"(M arx,
The

Germ an

Ideology'} is an old adage that has fostered the interest of

pow er holders, does not assure, in any sense, that future developm ents
tow ards a global ideological hegemony will benefit poorer nations.
U nder a global hegemonic pow er form ation their oppression may
become hidden behind the veil o f the dominant ideology.^

Thus,

although "ideological" hegemony suggests a greater role for politics in
the international arena, those politics should be carefully

scrutinized.

Despite these limitations, the inclusion o f a Gramscian model o f
hegem ony

into

the corpus o f international relations literature does

strengthen our understandings o f the logic o f pow er in international
affairs—power is more than guns and butter.
that ideas are a "force," but also it supposes

Not only does it suggest
ideology can be used as a

tool to stabilize or transform social structure.
An acceptance o f a theory o f "ideological" hegemony creates an
expanded understanding of pow er at both the national and

4 Gramsci would, of course, contest this point and want to argue
that the trend in history is towards a socialist world; that the
developm ent o f counter-hegem onic belief systems will foster the
interest o f the formerly dominated classes.
If indeed hegemonic social
structures are more than false consciousness, as one o f Gramsci's
French critics contends, if they due usher in their own systems of
justice and m orality, then how are we to differentiate between them?
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international level.

Cox's theory of "hegemony in production" as well as

K eohane’s emphasis on rules and institutions provide two examples of
work pointing in this direction.

Even where the theory o f "ideological"

hegemony is examined, understood, and not actively applied, that
exercise involves a critical examination o f the way in which words are
used.

W here the theory of "ideological" hegemony is actively applied it

stresses the .possibility of political solutions to global problem s.^
Strategically it calls for greater emphasis on the developm ent of, and
support for, international institutions.

At present it seems unlikely that

the dominant nation-states would be w illing to transfer pow er from
their national bases to international organizations.

However, structural

changes in the global economy may necessitate such a movement.

5 For relatively weak nation-states a strategy incorporating
"ideological" hegemony suggests that it may be in their interest to
actively support and participate in the institutions of the em erging
global civil society.
In a sense, relatively weak nations could engage in
a "war o f position"—a struggle for an institutional say-- with relatively
stronger nations.
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